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Abstract
In a recent issue of Economics and Politics Crain and Leonard (1993) described the
effects of compulsory voting on government spending. The purpose of this paper is
twofold. First, problems in Crain and Leonard's approach are identified. Their use of
the median-voter model appears inconsistent and their choice of government
consumption rather than government expenditure is questionable. Second, this paper
begins an analysis of the composition of government expenditure. Cross-country data
tentatively suggests that non-voters benefit relative to voters from government
expenditure on health, housing and transfer payments while voters benefit from
government expenditure on defense and economic services.
I. INTRODUCTION2
In a recent issue of Economics and Politics Crain and Leonard (1993) address the
issues of compulsory voting rules and voluntary voting rules. The authors approach
this inquiry from the novel perspective of the effects of compulsory and voluntary
voting rules on government fiscal policies and, in particular, on the scale of
government expenditure. Two models are proposed by the authors to explain
divergences in the scale of government expenditure across countries with different
voting rules: the median-voter model, which in the context of the present topic,
focuses attention on the demographic characteristics of voters, and the pressure
group model which is based on the self-interested behaviour of lobby groups.
1
The rationale for this paper is twofold. First, certain problems underlying
Crain and Leonard's approach are identified. In particular, it is argued that the
median-voter model is used in an inconsistent manner by the authors. More
seriously, it is also argued that the choice of general government consumption rather
than central government expenditure is inconsistent with the use of either model in
the present context. General government consumption includes expenditure by non-
central government but excludes transfer payments.
Second, this paper attempts to build upon the insights offered by Crain and
Leonard's approach. Rather than focusing upon the size of government expenditure
this paper focuses upon the composition of government expenditure. The starting
point for this analysis is the assumption that the pressure group model is the
appropriate model for explaining differences in government expenditure policies
pursued by countries with compulsory voting rules and countries with voluntary
voting rules. Given the reasonable assumption that government expenditure policies
pursued by countries with compulsory voting rules are more likely to incorporate the
                    
1 See Bardhan and Roemar (1992, p.104) for the use of these two approaches in an alternative context.3
preferences of people who would be voluntary non-voters under voluntary voting
rules, the differences in government expenditure across countries with different
voting rules allows us to infer the beneficiaries of the various components of
government expenditure.
It should be noted that this paper does not attempt to address the more
fundamental and complex issue of why people vote or do not vote under voluntary
voting rules. One possible approach to this issue, consistent with the approach
adopted in this paper, is to assume the existence of some exogenous voting cost
which can differ in magnitude across individuals or groups. Under the pressure
group model of expenditure determination voters are assumed to impose a negative
fiscal spillover on non-voters, that is non-voters' taxes contribute towards
government expenditure which is directed disproportionately towards voters. The
absolute size of this fiscal spillover in the voluntary voting system is limited by the
size of the exogenous voting cost confronting voluntary non-voters. If the fiscal
spillover from voters to voluntary non-voters exceeded this exogenous cost then the
voluntary non-voters would become voters.
Section 2 of this paper outlines the two alternative models proposed by Crain
and Leonard to explain differences in government expenditure across countries
utilizing compulsory voting and voluntary voting rules. Two sources of problems are
identified in the model comparison procedure as carried out by the authors. The first
issue concerns the rather ad-hoc identification of the net beneficiaries of government
expenditure. The second, and more fundamental, issue concerns the choice of
general government consumption rather than central government expenditure as the
appropriate measure of the scale of "government". The authors' choice is particularly
problematic in the context of the proposed explanation of the fiscal outcomes of the
voting processes.
Section 3 attempts to build upon the strengths of Crain and Leonard's novel4
approach to analysing government expenditure. The focus of attention moves from
the scale of government involvement in total expenditure in the economy to the
composition of government expenditure. By accepting the pressure group approach
to the determination of the composition of government expenditure differences in
government expenditure patterns across counties with compulsory and voluntary
voting rules are used to identify the net beneficiaries of various components of
government expenditure.
Section 3 also outlines the results derived from this analysis. Although the
econometric results cannot be regarded as definitive in terms of levels of statistical
significance, it is clear that the composition of government expenditure is influenced
by the choice of voting rule. In particular, under compulsory voting rules as opposed
to voluntary voting rules, expenditure on defense and economic services is relatively
lower while expenditure on health is relatively higher. Expenditure on housing,
which also incorporates expenditure on transfer payments due to data limitation
problems, is relatively higher under compulsory voting but not to a very significant
extent. Expenditure on education displays no systematic relationship to voting rules
but data limitations do not allow us to decompose education expenditure into
expenditures on the different levels of education.
These results suggest that in a country with voluntary voting rules, non-voters
tend to benefit (relative to voters) from government expenditure on health and, to a
smaller extent, housing and transfer payments. In other words, government
expenditure on health tends to be more redistributive towards the type of individual
who is a non-voter while government expenditure on defence and economic services
tends to be more redistributive towards the type of individual who is a voter.
The conclusion notes the contribution of this paper to the economics and
politics literature and suggests some further directions for a research strategy
initially suggested by Crain and Leonard's paper.5
II. CRAIN AND LEONARD'S ANALYSIS
By analysing the effects of compulsory voting rules on the fiscal policies of a cross
section of democratically elected governments, Crain and Leonard attempt to
choose between two alternative models of governmental decision-making. These
models will be referred to as the median-voter model and the pressure group model
throughout the following discussion.
The median-voter model contrasts the demographic characteristics of voters
under the voluntary and compulsory voting regimes. Under compulsory voting rules
the number of non-voters is insignificant while under voluntary voting rules, the
number of non-voters can be quite large.
2 Crain and Leonard argue that the
demographic characteristics of voluntary non-voters suggest that they are net gainers
of government's fiscal policies. Consequently it is argued that the introduction of
compulsory voting would shift the position of the median voter and increase
government spending, "The demography-based analysis implies compulsory voting
will increase the size of government relative to voluntary voting rules." (Crain and
Leonard, 1993, p.44).
The pressure group model takes a more sceptical view of the voting process
and sees government's decisions, and in particular fiscal decisions, as being
influenced by the lobbying activities of self-interested pressure groups. In this model
under voluntary voting rules non-voters are net losers of government's fiscal policies.
The introduction of compulsory voting would curtail fiscal spillovers from voters to
non-voters and consequently decrease government spending, "Thus, the interest
group framework suggests that CVRs (compulsory voting rules) will reduce
                    
2 "Participation rates average better than 90 per cent of the eligible population in the compulsory voting rules
countries; in voluntary voting countries, average participation is closer to 50 per cent." (Crain and Leonard,
1993 p.43).6
government activity and expenditure." (Crain and Leonard, 1993, p.45).
Crain and Leonard's subsequent analysis deals with model selection. Their
view of the relative amount of government spending under voluntary and
compulsory voting rules in the median-voter model is, however, seriously flawed
both in its foundations and in its implementation. Their conclusion that compulsory
voting increases government spending in the median-voter model depends on two
separate factors.
(1) The empirical observation that voluntary non-voters tend to be different, in
particular, "..., the set of eligible non-voters tends to be: poorer, less-well educated,
younger, and disproportionately higher in minority groups than the set of voluntary
voters." Crain & Leonard (1993, p.44).
(2) The claim that non-voters are net beneficiaries of government fiscal policies,  "In
short, voluntary non-voters are plausibly net recipients of government services."
Crain & Leonard (1993, p.44).
With regard to (1), Mueller (1989) in an overview of the characteristics
associated with non-voting individuals argues "... income is consistently, positively
correlated with the probability of voting." (p.365) and "Years of education have
proven to be positively and significantly related to voter turnout in virtually every
study of voter participation." (p.365). Despite reservations based on the fact that
most studies are US-based and on the potentially troublesome issue of
multicollinearity between some of the explanatory variables, e.g., rich, well-
educated, member of majority groups..., it seems clear that voters and non-voters are
different and that the direction of this difference in terms of, say, income is not in
contention.7
With regard to (2), however, it is by no means clear that members of the
group comprising "poorer, less-well educated, younger, and disproportionately
higher in minority groups" are net gainers of government policies. Restricting
attention to government's fiscal policies (as Crain and Leonard do), perhaps the best
supporting evidence for the above view would be in health expenditures. For
example, Barr (1987) in the context of the British national health system argues that,
"The national health service..., despite some inequalities, is remarkably egalitarian."
(p.419).
With respect to transfer payments, where a priori, one might expect significant
levels of vertical redistribution, the evidence is not overwhelming. Barr (1989)
argues that,
"The overall success of cash benefits in practice is also controversial." (p.418).
One should, however, note that the overall redistributive effect of the tax-and-
transfer system tends to be underestimated owing to the failure of policy analysts to
correctly identify the relevant counterfactual to be used in comparing the before tax-
and-transfer system with the after tax-and-transfer system. In particular, gross
income given the existence of a tax-and-transfer system is not the correct
counterfactual.
3
Governments' spending behaviour on education and housing casts particular
doubts on Crain and Leonard's rather benevolent view of governments' fiscal
policies,
                    
3 See Ringen (1987, Chapter 8) for an excellent review of this issue and other related issues.8
"The evidence suggests that middle-class children on average receive a
disproportionate share of educational resources in terms of both quantity and
quality; and that these differentials cannot be attributed solely to differences in
tastes. In addition, the finance of university education is almost certainly regressive."
Barr (1987, p.419).
"Housing is the one major area where the welfare state has performed badly, not
through choosing controversial aims, but by adopting methods which are unlikely to
achieve them. ... The distributional effects of the subsidies are also largely perverse:
owner-occupiers (mainly in the higher socio-economic groups) benefit
disproportionately; and the redistributive impact of rent control and subsidies to
local authority housing, despite some shift towards income subsidies in the 1980s,
retains an arbitrary element." Barr (1987, p.419).
Overall, the evidence in favour of (2) is at best mixed and depends crucially
on which facet of government policy one focuses on. It is difficult, however, to
accept Crain and Leonard's argument that the validity of the median-voter model as
an explanation of government expenditure depends upon the existence of a positive
relationship between countries with compulsory voting and countries with relatively
higher levels of government expenditure. The median-voter model has no obvious
predictions to make with respect to the relationship between different voting rules
and the scale of government expenditures. In effect, the median-voter model acts as
a strawman. The median-voter may, however, have predictions to make with respect
to the composition of government expenditure. This issue will be addressed in the
next section.
Crain and Leonard's second proposed model stems from pressure group
theories of government expenditure. The existence of compulsory voting, it is9
argued, reduces the possibility for fiscal spillovers from voters to non-voters and
consequently reduces pressure groups' incentive to spend resources on lobbying in
the first place. In positing a negative relationship between government expenditure
and the existence of compulsory voting, however, the authors appear to be
"jumping-the-gun". Although the scope for fiscal spillovers is reduced with the
introduction of compulsory voting and consequently one may expect less
government expenditure on items of particular benefit to voters under a voluntary
voting system, is it not reasonable to expect increased government expenditure on
items of particular benefit to non-voters under a voluntary voting system?
Notwithstanding this question, however, it appears from Table 1, which shows
Crain and Leonard's results, that the growth rate in the size of government is
significantly lower under countries with compulsory voting rules.
4 Table 1 displays
the OLS regression results with T-statistics in parentheses where the explanatory
variable is average government growth rate and the explanatory variables are:
average annual growth rate for gross domestic product (GRGDP); a dummy
variable for the existence of compulsory voting rules (CVR); a dummy variable for
the enforcement of compulsory voting rules (ENFORCE); literacy rates
(LITERACY) and national income per person (LVSTD).
It is apparent from these results that a negative relationship exists between the
existence of compulsory voting (enforced or otherwise) and annual government
growth rates. However, the authors' choice of dependent variable is not central
government expenditure, as would appear to be the obvious candidate, but general
government consumption. This is not an trivial matter as the following definitions
from the World Development Report (1989) make clear:
                    
4 Although Crain and Leonard's discussion centres on the effects of alternative voting rules on the size of
"government", their subsequent analysis focuses on the growth rate in the size of "government". See Section III
for further discussion on this point.10
General government consumption: "General government consumption includes all
current expenditures for purchases of goods and services by all levels of
government." (p.235).
Central government expenditure: "Central government expenditure comprises the
expenditure by all government offices, departments, establishments, and other
bodies that are agencies or instruments of the central authority of a country."
(p.237).
The Report proceed to outlines the effect of these differences,
"Total expenditure (as a percentage of GNP) is more narrowly defined than the
measure of general government consumption (percentage of GDP) ..., because it
excludes consumption expenditure by state and local governments. At the same
time, central government expenditure is more broadly defined because it includes
government's gross domestic investment and transfer payments." (p.237).
Table 2 shows the significant differences between these two definitions in terms of
actual values for a range of countries. In particular, it should be noted that no
systematic difference between the two measurements across countries can be
expected. Countries with a significant level of transfer payments, for example, will
show a higher level of central government expenditure relative to general
government consumption. Conversely, countries with federal systems of
governments will show a lower level of central government expenditure relative to
general government consumption.
In terms of Crain and Leonard's choice of general government consumption
rather than central government expenditure, it is clear that their failure to incorporate11
transfer payments under government spending will tend to underestimate the growth
in spending on an item which one would expect to increase significantly as countries
move from a voluntary voting system to a compulsory voting system. In short, it
would be surprising if "government" increased under compulsory voting if one used
general government consumption rather than central government expenditure as the
definition of government.
In summary, it can be argued that Crain and Leonard's paper does not contain
two alternative models and that their choice of dependant variable contributes
significantly to the negative relationship shown to exist between the growth in the
size of government and the existence of a compulsory voting system. A more fruitful
line of inquiry suggested, but not implemented, in their approach is to focus on the
composition of government expenditure rather than on the scale of government
expenditure.
III. THE COMPOSITION OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE
Adopting either the median voter model or the pressure group model of the political
process it is clear that government expenditure, both in size and composition, will
more accurately reflect the tastes of the entire eligible-to-vote population under
compulsory voting rules.
5 In contrast, under voluntary voting rules the composition
of government spending is biased towards the preferences of the voting population.
The introduction of compulsory voting can be expected to reduce the negative fiscal
spillovers from voters to non-voters and consequently by comparing the composition
of government expenditure across different voting regimes the net gainers from
various components of government expenditure can be revealed.
                    
5 This does not imply that societal welfare, however defined, is necessarily higher under compulsory voting
rules nor does it imply that non-voters become "better-off" under compulsory voting. See the comments on the
costs of voting above.12
The comparison of the components of government expenditure across voting
systems is by way of each component of government expenditure as a percentage of
total government expenditures. For reasons unclear, Crain and Leonard's analysis
focused on the rates of change of the independent variable and one dependent
variable rather than on the actual values of these variable at a point in time. Their
procedure would fail to identify countries with significantly different levels of
government expenditure so long as the growth rates of government expenditure
were equivalent. Their analysis also excluded high-income countries so as to obtain
"a more homogeneous test group" which seems rather unnecessary given their
inclusion of the explanatory variable representing national income per person
(LVSTD).
Data limitation problems restrict the scope of the economic analysis to some
extent. The World Development Report (various years) provides a rich data set but
data requirements are rather demanding in the present context and consequently all
regressions are based on an analysis of central government expenditure behaviour in
a total of 41 countries with democratically elected governments; 15 countries with
compulsory voting rules and 26 countries with voluntary voting rules (See Table A
in the Appendix for details).
The independent variables which are based on the breakdown of central
government expenditure data available from the World Development Reports are,
Defense: Defense expenditure as a percentage of central government
expenditure,
Education: Education expenditure as a percentage of central government
expenditure,
Health: Health expenditure as a percentage of central government
expenditure,13
Housing and Transfers: Housing and community amenities and social security
and welfare expenditure as a percentage of central government expenditure,
and
Economic Services: Expenditure on regulation, regional development and
trade promotion as a percentage of central government expenditure.
Interested readers are directed towards International Monetary Fund (1986) for
more details on the exact definitions and scope of these variables. It should also be
noted that the reliability of the data in terms of comparability is difficult to
guarantee, "... Caution should therefore be exercised in using the data for cross-
country comparisons."  (World Development Report 1989, p.237). The following
explanatory variables were utilized in the regressions,
CVR: A dummy variable signalling the existence of compulsory voting rules,
ENFORCE: A dummy variable signalling the enforcement of compulsory
voting rules, and
GNP/POP: Gross national product per person.
The last variable is incorporated into the regression analysis so as to account for
changes in the proportional amount of expenditure on certain components of
government expenditure as gross national product per capita increases. One would
expect this variable to have positive effects on the absolute values of each
component of central government expenditure but in terms of the proportion of
government expenditure assigned to each category, matters are less predictable.
With respect to the two dummy variables, CVR and ENFORCE, the sign of
the coefficients will allow us to infer some details on the net beneficiaries of
government expenditure. If the proportion of central government expenditure on,14
say, defense is significantly lower under compulsory voting, i.e., a negative co-
efficient on the dummy variable representing compulsory voting (CVR), then
defense expenditure can be assumed to disproportionately benefit the type of person
who votes under a non-compulsory voting regime. Similar arguments hold for the
other dependent variables: education; health; housing and community amenities and
social security and welfare.
Table 3 shows the results of the OLS regressions for the relevant components
of central government expenditure for the year 1991 where P-values or the observed
levels of significance are given in parentheses.
6 Table 3 only incorporates the
dummy variable representing the existence of compulsory rules (CVR) but Table B
in the Appendix shows that replacing CVR with the dummy variable ENFORCE
which signals the enforcement, rather than the simple existence, of compulsory
voting has only minor effects on the results.
In terms of the effects of voting rules on fiscal policies, Table 3 tentatively
suggests that the adoption of compulsory voting rules decreases the proportional
amount of government expenditure on defense and economic services. It also
suggests that proportional expenditure on health and, to a smaller extent, housing
and transfers increases under compulsory voting. Consequently it can be argued that
if the pressure group model of policy formulation is appropriate, defense and
economic services expenditures by a central government are of relative benefit to
the type of individual who votes in a country with voluntary voting rules.
Conversely, it may be argued that central government expenditure on health is of
relative benefit to the type of person who does not vote in a country with voluntary
voting rules. Given the pecuniary characteristics of voters and non-voters the above
results tentatively suggest that central government expenditure on health and
                    
6 The smaller the P-value, the greater the evidence against the implicit assumption that the relevant co-efficient
is zero.15
housing and transfers tends to be more egalitarian than central government
expenditure on defense and economic services.
Although a direct comparison of Crain and Leonard's results with the present
results is not possible for the many reasons outlined in the previous section, an
insight into the difficulties underlying their approach can be gleaned from Table 4.
The dependent variables in Table 4 represent the proportion of gross domestic
product accounted for by general government consumption (G/GDP) and the
proportion of gross national product accounted for by central government
expenditures (GEXP/GNP). As the OLS regressions reveal the scale of government,
when government is defined in terms of general government consumption rather
than central government expenditures, is effected to a greater extent in terms of level
of significance by the presence of compulsory voting rules. This is consistent with
Crain and Leonard's approach.
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper offers a positive analysis of alternative voting rules to the extent that it
comments upon the different government expenditure patterns observed across
countries with different voting rules. This paper avoids a more inclusive and
normative analysis of the issues underlying the choice between compulsory and
voluntary voting rules which would incorporate an analysis of the extra costs of
voting imposed on voluntary non-voters under compulsory voting. The more
philosophical issue of whether individuals should have the right not to vote not just
the right to spoil their vote is also not addressed in the present paper.
This paper, however, makes a contribution to the growing literature in
economics and politics. By focusing on the composition of government expenditure
and by adopting the insights offered by pressure group theories of policy formation16
it is possible to identify the net beneficiaries of various components of government
policies. Previous attempts to identify the net gainers and losers of particular
government polices encountered numerous objections stemming from general
equilibrium considerations. The approach outlined in this paper allows the data to
tell us its own story.
Table 1: OLS Results on Annual Government Growth Rates:
Average For 1980-198717

































Source: Table 2, Crain and Leonard (1993, p.47).














Source: World Development Report 1989.
Table 3: OLS Results on Components of Government Expenditure 1991
Dependent Variables18
(as percentage of central government expenditure)





































Table 4: Scale of Government 1991
Independent Variables






























CVR ENF DEF EDUC HLTH HSE SER GNP/POP G/GDP GEX/GNP
Argentina 1 1 10 10 3 39 16 2790 4 13
Australia 1 1 9 7 13 31 8.3 17050 19 28
Austria 1 1 2 9 13 48 9.1 20140 18 40
Bolivia 1 1 13 19 3 19 16.9 650 15 19
Brazil 1 1 4 3 7 26 3.2 2940 9 35
Costa Rica 1 1 0 19 32 13 8.6 1850 16 26
Domin. Rep. 1 1 5 10 14 20 36.5 940 9 12
Ecuador 1 1 13 18 11 3 11.8 1000 8 16
Greece 1 1 7 6 9 1 8.8 6340 20 60
Guatemala 1 0 13 20 10 8 21.7 930 6 12
Mexico 1 0 2 14 2 13 13.4 3030 8 18
Panama 1 1 5 17 21 24 6.1 2130 21 30
Paraguay 1 1 13 13 4 15 12.8 1270 8 9
Singapore 1 1 24 20 5 8 16.8 14210 11 22
Uruguay 1 1 9 7 5 50 8.7 2840 13 27
Bangladesh 0 0 10 11 5 8 34.4 220 11 15
Botswana 0 0 13 21 5 16 16.8 2530 28 42
Canada 0 0 7 3 5 36 11.2 20440 21 24
Denmark 0 0 5 10 1 40 7.6 23700 25 42
Finland 0 0 5 15 11 37 18.8 23980 24 31
France 0 0 6 7 15 46 5.1 20380 18 44
Germany 0 0 8 1 18 49 8.7 23650 18 33
India 0 0 17 3 2 7 20.8 330 12 18
Ireland 0 0 3 12 13 29 12.8 11120 16 48
Israel 0 0 22 0 4 31 10.1 11950 28 36
S.Korea 0 0 22 16 2 11 19.2 6330 11 17
Madagascar 0 0 8 17 7 2 35.9 210 9 16
Nepal 0 0 6 11 5 7 43 180 10 18
Netherlands 0 0 5 11 12 43 6.4 18780 14 53
New Zealand 0 0 4 12 12 37 10.6 12350 17 44
Norway 0 0 8 9 10 39 17.5 24220 21 46
Pakistan 0 0 28 2 1 3 11.6 400 13 22
Peru 0 0 16 21 6 1 0 1070 5 9
Spain 0 0 5 6 14 38 11 12450 16 34
Sri Lanka 0 0 9 8 5 18 24.6 500 10 29
Sweden 0 0 6 10 1 56 8 25110 27 44
Thailand 0 0 17 20 7 6 24.3 1570 10 16
Turkey 0 0 10 18 3 3 25.2 1780 17 30
UK 0 0 11 3 13 32 8.5 16550 21 28
US 0 0 22 2 14 29 10.1 22240 18 25
Zimbabwe 0 0 17 23 8 4 22.4 650 21 36
Source: World Development Report 1993.
Table B: OLS Results on Components of Government Expenditure 1991
Dependent Variables
(as percentage of central government expenditure)20
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